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This paper begins with a reminder of the constitutional and institutional frameworks of allegiances,
identification and citizenship rights. Then it argues that there are grounds for questioning the customary
conceptual and political overlap between nationality and citizenship. Some decoupling has taken place
in the EU and the paper considers competing assessments as to how well these specific supranational
institutions are protecting rights. In conclusion, Carlos Closa s idea is drawn on that supranational
citizenship has more potential than national citizenship to be democratic. His claim that civil society in
the European Union (EU) is too weak to take advantage of this potentiality may be reinforced by en-
largement. This is not because of the introduction of a further set of nationalities into a supranational
citizenship system but because of a new complexity in the principled norms which Closa says have to be
present in a site of democratic citizenship. in view of this, there are lessons to be learned from American
theories of republican federalism which, as expounded by Sam Beer, have much in common with a
modern interest among radical democrats in deliberative or dialogic democracy.
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1. Introduction
In this respect, the EU experience is consider-
ably different from that of the United States of
America (USA). First, the authority of states that
formed or joined the EU was incomparably more
entrenched than those of the young ex-colonies which
came together to make the constitution of the United
States (Meehan, 1996). Thus, they had the power and
legitimacy to do what the Anti-Federalists argued for
in the debate about the American Constitution. They
created a system in which the apex of the 'govern-
ment' of the EU and the governments of the member
states are not separated. The European Council;
which discusses intergovernmental strategy, is com-
posed of the heads of governments and the Council
of Ministers, which makes the final decisions about
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common policies, is made up of relevant ministers
from member state cabinets. Thus, the EU is regu-
lated by its own members - notwithstanding the fact
that the Commission has more powers than national
bureaucracies. This confederal characteristic of the
EU is bolstered by a state-based system of elections
to the European Parliament and by the absence of
union-wide parties - though there are increasingly
coherent transnational groupings of 'party families'
This structure of European government re-
flects a view about the protection of popular rights
and interests similar to that of the Anti-Federalists.
The views of the latter that these were best protected
through foci of allegiance and channels of account-
ability that already existed in the states has an echo
in the two main understandings of subsidiarity. One
of these is that it protects state sovereignty [and thus,
indirectly, popular sovereignty] by requiring the
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2. Citizenship and NationalityCommission to demonstrate convincingly that pro-
posed actions cannot be carried out by states acting
alone. The other understanding is that subsidiarity
directly enhances popular sovereignty by requiring
decision to be taken 'as close to the people as possi-
ble' .
However, the free choice of states to found or
join the EU becomes more constrained when it comes
to determining its development. As Carlos Closa (
I998(a) and 1998(b)) points out, member states do
not remain 'the masters of the contract' because of a
vigorous EU legal doctrine that 'the Treaties are a
kind of constitution'. These have led to 'a body of
legislation and principles' whose future cannot be
predicted and from which member states cannot exit.
They cannot exit because they all subscribe to the
principle of the rule oflaw and, hence, to the obliga-
tion of compliance. Political decisions taken by the
member states themselves have similar conse-
quences.
Member states do control explicit 'constitu-
tional' reform of the EU through the procedure of
unanimous decision-making in the Council ofMin-
isters - though this does not mean much for control
by national citizens, given the difficulties of parlia-
mentary scrutiny. This is the same for some 'ordi-
nary' policy decisions. But other 'ordinary' policy
decisions are made by qualified or simple majority
voting which are binding on all, whether or not na-
tional democratic procedures have resulted in a gov-
ernment with a contrary conception of its interests.
But, as Closa also argues, there is a further twist to
this problem. This is that, if the EU lacks popular
democratic legitimacy in an institutional or proce-
dural sense, it has a social legitimacy in its delivery
of policies that meet peoples' essentially private in-
terests in a European market economy. The stagna-
tion induced by a long period up to 1985 of insist-
ence on unanimity about everything put integration
at risk sufficiently for member states to agree to more
frequent use of majority voting so that policies could
be delivered more effectively and efficiently. Para-
doxically, then, weak national control is functional
to the maintenance of the EU's social legitimacy.
The question arises, therefore, as to whether
supranational democratic citizenship can grow in a
context in which current national conceptions of it
seem inconsistent with what is needed for EU legiti-
macy. More will be said about this in the conclu-
sion. Before that, it should be suggested that the EU
is not the aberration that it is sometimes taken to be
in decoupling, to some extent, nationality and citi-
zenship.
As it has been suggested elsewhere (Meehan,
1993, 1996, where the author's gratitude to many
other scholars are cite), there are good grounds for
treating the overlap of citizenship and nationality as
a matter of historical contingency and not as an ana-
lytically necessary connection. In short, nationality
is a legal identity from which no rights need arise,
though obligations might - as is obvious when na-
tionals are called 'subjects'. Conversely, citizenship
is a practice, or a form of belonging, resting on a set
oflegal, social and participatory entitlements which
may be conferred, and sometimes are, irrespective
of nationality - or denied, as in the case of women,
regardless of nationality.
While borders had been porous in the Middle
and Late-Middle Ages and migration normal, the stra-
tegic interests of new states lay in impregnability and
control of persons with or without leave to cross fron-
tiers. Nationality was an obvious criterion and proof
of nationality a simple method of verification. The
process of modernization in the new states went hand
in hand with the construction of the nation. This
served external and internal purposes. It created a
sense of the 'Otherness' of those who were a threat
to the strategic interests of political elites. And it
fostered the loyalty or allegiance that induced will-
ingness to be taxed to fund the defence of the state
and to be enlisted into military service. Since 1945,
allegiance is relevant less to military purposes than
to the legitimacy of redistribution and the funding
of welfare systems (Miller, 1993).
The construction of the nation was promoted
through the dismantling of feudal bonds and their
replacement by a gradual extension of legal and po-
litical rights. So complete became the overlap be-
tween national identity and citizenship status that,
in many. political systems, even those with separate
words [unlike Germany], 'citizenship' and 'nation-
ality' became interchangeable. And, according to
Raymond Aron, it was a contradiction in terms to
see citizenship rights as capable of being guaranteed
by anything other than the state, more particularly
the nation-state, and certainly not by a regime - the
EU - that was not a state at all.
But, using 'citizenship' as a synonym for 'na-
tionality' can result in peculiar distortions of mean-
ing. In late 19th century America, the Supreme Court
ruled that a woman was, indeed, an American citi-
zen but that being a citizen did not necessarily carry
the right to vote. This empties the classical concep-
tion of 'citizen' of part of its core meaning and the
ruling makes conceptual sense only if we substitute
'national' for 'citizen'; [that is, taking 'citizen' at its
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face value and leaving aside, for present purposes, a
feminist account of its 'deep structure']. In other
systems, both terms are employed in legislation but
as though 'nationality and citizenship' were all one
word in which the first and last components were
interchangeable. For example, except for one Arti-
cle of the 1922 Constitution, it was not until 1962
that Irish official documents, began to be clear that
there was a difference between citizenship as nation-
ality and citizenship as the capacity to exercise rights.
The current British passport still says 'Nationality:
British citizen' .
However, from a longer historical perspective,
it can be seen that citizenship is not the same as na-
tionality but is about enabling people to participate
in creating, maintaining and enjoying the good soci-
ety, whether the people belonging to a society in-
habited a citadel, a city-state, a locality, an empire,
the world - and even, since John Stuart Mill and es-
pecially in Germany, the work-place. In the young
United States of America, a century before the rul-
ing, just mentioned, and at the time of the making of
the Constitution, there was no overarching Ameri-
can national identity and this did not evolve for a
very long time. But there were citizenship rights, even
if undemocratic by today's standards, and the best
way of protecting them was a passionate bone of
contention between The Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists. More recently, a survey of eleven Euro-
pean countries shows no wholly systematic pattern
of attaching nationality restrictions to legal and so-
cial entitlements and rights to participate in politics
(Gardner, 1997). For example, the British are aliens
under Irish law but British nationals resident in Ire-
land now have most of the rights of citizenship. The
Irish are neither alien nor British under United King-
dom (UK) law but, like resident Commonwealth
nationals, have always been able to exercise all the
rights of citizenship. Similar arrangements exist in
the Nordic League. In the EU, rules about who a
state's nationals are and how that nationality may be
acquired or lost remain matters for national decision-
making. It is that then activates their status of Euro-
pean citizen - though recently, the UK government
was taken to task for denying the right to vote in
European elections to Gibraltarians [not full nation-
als since 1981 but British Protected Persons; full
nationality was restored to colonial citizens earlier
this year]. For those who have been defined as na-
tionals of member states, EU citizenship is about
participation and the enjoyment of 'the good soci-
ety' in the Union as a whole. As noted in conclu-
sion, the European 'good society' is criticized as lib-
ertarian - offering private rights to individuals. But,
it may be worth noting that the preambles to its di-
rectives on social policy often echo, if dimly, the clas-
sical conception of the 'good societyas a collective
moral order of justice and conviviality. Now some-
thing will be said on how well the promise of
supranational citizenship has been met in the EU.
3. Assessments of EU Citizenship
Assessments ofEU citizenship are contradic-
tory, possibly being determined by divergent gen-
eral ideological and epistemological outlooks. Some-
times, they seem guided by whether the commenta-
tor favours or opposes European integration
(Meehan, 199b).
Sometimes, they seem to depend on whether
the analyst is a positivist who examines only what
exists concretely and compares its slightness to na-
tional provisions - but overlooking the contrast be-
tween decades and centuries of evolution in the EU
and national systems respectively (Meehan, 1993).
Conversely, other analysts suggest that what is im-
portant is not the size but the dynamics of change;
that is, the fact that established norms have been
breached at all opens the possibility, though not the
inevitability, of new paradigms.
The oldest criticism of EU citizenship starts
from the limitations of the Treaty of Rome as a basis
for rights. These being restricted to the freedom of
movement of goods, capital, labour and services
mean that European rights were restricted to the 'citi-
zen-as-worker' instead of reflecting the normative
principle that people are citizens because they are
human beings. This makes it particularly defective
for women, given the impact of conceptions of the
public and private and the domestic division of la-
bour, and; in practice, all those not in regular, con-
ventional employment. Also, although jurisprudence
in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) tended to
expand the scope of rights and to limit anomalies
within and across states, at least until the 1980s, the
legal instruments and enforcement procedures can
make it difficult to realize rights that are, in practice,
common across the Community. It is also argued that
the evolution of European citizenship replicates in a
larger arena the physical and social exclusion of peo-
ple without the right nationality. ['Third country'
migrants within the Community, however, do have
some protection under the original Treaty of Rome,
if they are members of a migrant EU family or as a
result of agreements between the Community and
third countries.] Concerns about the narrowness of
rights began to be acknowledged in the mid-1970s,
grew with the momentum of discussion of an 'ever
closer union' in the 1980s, and were reflected in the
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Maastricht Treaty. Though there are positive assess-
ments of Maastricht and prior developments, the
1991 Treaty has been criticized for not going far
enough.
All critics note that the status and, hence, rights
of EU citizens continue to rest upon nationality of a
member state and that this remains a prerogative of
member state governments (but see note above about
Gibraltar and the UK). They also note the exclusion
of General Elections, and potential derogations from
provisions for municipal and European elections.
These are possible where there are specific problems,
especially questions of national identities, as in Lux-
embourg where the proportion of residents from other
member states is larger than elsewhere (Closa, 1995).
O'Leary (1995) argues that: the pre-existing direct
legal link [van Gend en Loos - see above] between
individuals and the centre is slight, a view reinforced
by a Gelman ruling about the 1991 Treaty [Manfred
Brunner and others v The European Union Treaty,
Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2159/92 [ 1994] 1 CMLR
57; see also Harmsen, 1994]; the new voting rights
are little more than reciprocal arrangements which
could exist, and sometimes do, irrespective of un-
ion; and that it will be difficult in practice to use the
right to diplomatic and consular protection by other
member states. Curtin and Meijers ( 1995) identify
hypocrisy on the part of member state governments,
except Denmark and the Netherlands, in their osten-
sible intention to enhance rights to information.
Member states' restrictive applications of these meas-
ures to information about border policies reinforce
at a European level the 'closure' effects of citizen-
ship on people from outside (see also Kostakopoulou,
1998, on the 'securitization' of immigration). In the
social field, the Commission's capacity to expand a
regulatory regime of rights is restricted to what it
may opportunistically introduce in a context of a re-
luctant Council of Ministers (Mazey, 1996). Critics
of Maastricht also stress the limitations oflocal part-
nership, regional subsidiarity and the status, powers
and budget of the Committee of the Regions.
So far there has been a cautious welcome for
the Amsterdam Treaty. Positive views (eg, Oreja,
18.6.97; Institute of European Affairs, 24.6.97) have
been expressed about: the adoption of strong nor-
mative principles of rights; the new basis for com-
bating more forms of discrimination; the procedures
for dealing with infringements of rights; the inclu-
sion of the Employment Chapter; the references to
reducing exclusion; and the proposal to set stand-
ards for 'third country' nationals at work and in free
movement. The Treaty's references to national and
Union representative bodies goes a little way towards
Chryssochoou's ( 1996) insistence that' democratic
deficits' need to be addressed on both planes if the
experience of citizenship is to be realized to its full.
On the other hand, the Commission itself reflects
some of the concerns of voluntary organisations by
regretting the limitations of social policy (European
Commission, 1997(b), p. 6). It also notes that 'the
institutional system is not yet entirely equal to the
challenges' and regrets the opaqueness of the Trea-
ty's text (Oreja, 18.6.97). Moreover, 'under many ...
headings, ... the provisions may be criticized as be-
ing general rather than specific and aspirational rather
than tangible' (Institute of European Affairs, 24.
6.97).
But, as a foil to criticisms of the limitations of
Maastricht, there is an alternative assessment of EU
developments which can be applied equally to Am-
sterdam. For example, Weiner (1995) argues that citi-
zenship, including 'access' and 'belonging' as well
as rights, has never been static or uniform. She iden-
tifies in the history of integration confluences of
policy imperatives and the interests of key political
actors which have created breaches in nation-state
experiences of citizenship and opportunities for new
paradigms and practices.
In her account, the regulation of social rights
and relations between Community institutions and
the 'social', local and regional 'partners' [pre-dat-
ing Maastricht] are part of 'access' and 'belonging'
. The period of acceleration towards union is, in
Weiner's account, a time of discernible movement
in the paradigm of citizenship, containing the seeds
of new practice in the activation of rights. In par-
ticular, markets and migration make' place' , as well
as nationality, the conceptual and practical pre-con-
dition for triggering legal, political and social enti-
tlements. This could become significant not only for
nationals of member states but also for lawfully resi-
dent 'third country' migrants, as seems to be begin-
ning in Amsterdam.
Even if early reactions to the Amsterdam
Treaty are guarded, the movement reflected in it
seems to vindicate 0 'Keef's view that' [the] impor-
tance of the TEU [Maastricht]) citizenship provisions
lie not in their content but rather in the promise they
hold out for the future. The concept is a dynamic
one, capable of being added to or strengthened but
not diminished ' (cited in Chryssochoou, p. 30). The
same can be said, in turn, about Amsterdam.
I
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Moreover, the EU's ability to sustain its dual
claim of being 'for its citizens' (European Commis-
sion, 1997(b)) while also 'respect[ing] the national
identities of its Member States' (European Commis-
sion, 1997(a), p.S) depends upon such dynamism.
As it is well known from the USA, however, all sto-
ries of rights depend on what people make of them.
This requires us to consider the state of civil society.
4. Conclusion
If rights are to be more than symbolic and re-
sult in real redistribution of power or influence, much
depends on the ability of civil society 'to seize the
day' . Closa ( 1998(a) and 1998(b)) sees more po-
tential, in principle, in supranational than national
arenas for democratic citizenship. In practice, he
suggests however, European civil society may be too
fragile to transform EU citizenship into an arena for
democratic self-determination from what he calls an
enhanced set of private rights to make the most of
new market opportunities [or be sheltered a little from
its threats].
His argument rests on a critique of the case
that a shared national identity is a pre- condition for
citizenship. For, by insisting that citizenship can be
built only on such bonds, such theories propose that
a democratic practice be based on a commonality
that was formed under pre-democratic conditions.
In contrast, a site of democratic citizenship is one in
which people live together under a set of principled
bonds, such as those identified by Robert Dahl as
voting equality, effective participation, enlightened
understanding, control of agendas and inclusiveness.
In drawing this contrast, Closa suggests that
supranational citizenship is less vulnerable than na-
tional citizenship to charges of exclusion and dis-
crimination because, being unable to draw on com-
parable non-principled bonds, its success must de-
pend on democratic and human rights norms.
Dahl, of course, is a citizen of the USA where
democratic norms and ties [albeit defective] preceded
national bonding. In contrast, Britishness was forged
by elites, prior to democracy, to make bonds between
peoples who had been enemies of one another. It
worked for some centuries, in the context of differ-
ent sub-state national identities, as principled bonds
were grafted on to the pre-democratic unifications.
But the fragility of the origins is re-emerging and
there are claims, at least in Scotland, and to some
extent, Wales, which support Closa's case; that is,
that, from a democratic basis, a new union ofprinci-
pled norms can be negotiated at the supranational
level - the EU.
The idea that a multi-state supranational un-
ion may be preferable to unification with a single
neighbour arises from experience among the com-
ponent peoples of the UK in trying to make what
Closa calls their private EU rights have public con-
sequences. That is, people - not only nationalists but
also advocates for their regions - whose material in-
terests are enhanced by learning to use EU partner-
ship opportunities are trying to redefine their rela-
tionship to the domestic state in a European context,
to bring about new forms of mobilization and inter-
action, and to influence agendas. But, again in line
with Closa's theoretical case, unification into the
British state left pre-British civil society institutions
intact, especially in Scotland and Northern Ireland
and, hence, in a position to try either to improve the
principled bonds of the British state or to negotiate
new ones in a different arena.
Closa ( 1998(b)) is guarded about whether
there is a strong enough civil society in the EU as a
whole to transcend the defects of national citizen-
ship in order to bring about the benefits of a regime
based on principled bonds - without a willingness
on the part of states themselves to agree to stop try-
ing to maintain the impression that anxieties about
national identities are well attended to in EU provi-
sions. The changes which he suggests are necessary
include the avoidance of derogations and exemptions
which 'offer shelter to communitarian
understandings of the relationship between individu-
als and the state premissed on nationality'; 'the full
constitutionalization of a European political status';
greater opportunities for direct citizenship partici-
pation in EU affairs; stronger commonality and reci-
procity of rights in different member states; and will-
ingness by states to respond to 'spill-over' pressures
from EU citizenship status on to varying nationality
laws, including greater willingness to acknowledge
dual or multi-nationality. Something of the last is
beginning to happen. The German government has
just been forced by opponents to abandon a plan to
make dual-citizenship legal but it is going ahead in
allowing German citizenship to be acquired as of
right instead of discretion, not only as before by an-
cestry alone, but also through residence and natu-
ralization. The ECl is playing a role.
The Gibraltar issue has been mentioned. An-
other case was about a person with dual nationality -
of a member state and a third country. The ECl re-
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jected another member state's claim to be free to rec-
ognise only the third country dimension and, hence,
to deny rights.
If Closa is right about the weakness of Euro-
pean civil society in combating a privatized, liberal
or libertarian conception of citizenship, then enlarge-
ment may reinforce the challenge. The prospective
member states, while having to subscribe to princi-
ples ofliberty, democracy and human rights as a con-
dition of entry are not well placed to do so in prac-
tice - emerging as they are from totalitarianism which
suppressed civil society or bent it to the will of the
state. At a conference during the 1998 UK presi-
dency, harrowing tales were told of the vulnerability
of emergent civil society associations in the Balkans
and of discrimination against minorities in east and
east-central Europe. With or without minority prob-
lems, the concept of liberty - perhaps necessitated
by dire economic conditions - is, more libertarian
than that which Closa sees in the EU. It is the nega-
tive one of 'freedom from' restraint - not the 'free-
dom to' which is implicit in Christian- and social
democracy and still has some place in the link in the
EU model between social inclusion and economic
progress.
The point to be drawn here is not about the
addition of more nationalities, either per se or in their
further reduction of the overlap between nationality
and citizenship. It is that growing mismatches
amongst sets of principled bonds, not a more com-
plex collection of pre-democratic identifications, may
inhibit the transformation of EU citizenship along
the lines aspired to by Closa. If this is so, there is a
heavy burden on the political realm to democratize
the public space so that the various associations of
people can come face to face with their different in-
terests and agendas (Tassin, 1992) and, through a
process of dialogue, try to achieve outcomes that are,
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